Relentless Assimilationist Indigenous Policy: From Invasion of Group Rights to Genocide in Mercy’s Clothing by Miller, Lantz Fleming
Indigenous Policy Journal Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (Winter 2017) 
Miller. Relentless Assimilationist Policy. 1 
Relentless Assimilationist Indigenous Policy: From Invasion of 
Group Rights to Genocide in Mercy’s Clothing 
Lantz Fleming Miller1 
Abstract 
Despite the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, assimilationist policies continue, 
whether official or effective. Such policies affect more than the right to group choice. The concern is whether 
indeed genocide or “only” ethnocide (or culturecide)—the elimination of a traditional culture—is at work. 
Discussions of the distinction between the two terms have been inconsistent enough that at least one 
commentator has declared that they cannot be used in analytical contexts. While these terms, I contend, have 
distinct senses, yet in cases of governmental and other institutional assimilationist policy for indigenous peoples, 
such ethnocide effectively entails genocide. Insofar as any people’s cultural practices and beliefs are essential for 
life and health, individuals in groups value, if tacitly, their culture as highly as their language or any artifact: 
Thus, attempts to eradicate a culture through assimilation in fact eradicate individuals’ lives and health and so 
are effectively murderous. Acknowledgement by worldwide organizations that assimilationist ethnocide is 
effectively genocide should affect policy concerning indigenous peoples and thus has significance for 
international law. 
Introduction 
Documents and institutions such as the 1989 United Nations International Labor Organization 
Convention 169 and the 2007 Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have been landmarks in 
the history of protecting indigenous peoples’ rights worldwide to retain their group practices as they see 
fit. While such institutions have limited enforcement power, they at the least represent the increasing 
global recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to retain their autonomy and traditions. Canada’s 
Inherent Right Policy, for example, represents one such institution providing legal code with some 
enforcement capacity. This trend has developed simultaneously with policy actions such as autonomous 
Greenland and Canada’s recognition of Nunavut (McChesney 1992, Makarenko 2002), as well as 
increasing self-governance of some Australian Aborigine groups (Hyndman 1992) and Sami of 
Northern Europe (Svensson 1992). However, many other indigenous peoples’ struggles for their rights 
continue to lose ground as governments and other organizations either flout or do not recognize these 
protective institutions. Both de jure and de facto ongoing development policies in many nations, 
whether governmental or otherwise, have continued to displace and assimilate peoples, despite the 
harms of such practices to the affected indigenous peoples. 
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Currently (or recently) foraging peoples, small in numbers at the outset and vulnerable to 
encroachment, remain among the hardest hit. In Botswana, the government has ignored, fought, or 
flouted not only international nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs’) measures supporting the 
Jul’hoansi (Kung) peoples but even the Botswana Supreme Court’s rulings concerning them (Survival 
International 2013c). In Malaysia, the Penan, among other indigenous groups in that country, have been 
subjected to intensive governmental, industry-instigated, and missionary assimilationist policies for 
decades, especially as the forests of their traditional lands have proven lucrative for industry and 
development (Brosius 1999, Survival International 2013e; for missionaries’ continued work today, see 
Christian Missions in Many Lands 2015). While at most only a few hundred Penan have eluded 
assimilation into impoverished longhouses, these few have led a continuous fight to retain these lands 
for the Penan. Other nations, such as Indonesia (Syarif 2010), and Brazil (Survival International 
2013b), as well as nations having the world’s largest concentration of indigenous peoples, the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Reyhner and Singh 2010), continue to impose effectively 
assimilationist policies. These four last-mentioned nations refused at first to sign UNDRIP, and though 
Australia and New Zealand finally acceded, full implementation will take time, if it ever does occur. 
In this paper, I look to anthropological evidence of the fatal harms of assimilationist policy on 
indigenous peoples in the name of global development. While these harms may not be the avouched 
ends of the policymakers, they represent a necessary and now long-recognized outcome. Founders and 
backers of such policies can no longer elude responsibility for such outcomes, even if these are not the 
overt intention of the policy. If they do not abide by increasingly recognized institutions for protecting 
indigenous peoples’ cultural rights, they should then be understood as guilty for their policies’ de facto 
causing the deaths of the people concerned, they should be understood as perpetrating genocide. This 
fact then should give extra teeth for the international legal community in exhibiting the criminality of 
such policies. Certainly, there is far to go to ensuring that any association or institution has any teeth 
whatsoever in incriminating wrongdoers of indigenous genocide of this sort and seeking and 
establishing recompense for the victimized peoples.  However, establishing the connection between 
assimilationist policies is an important step toward giving international associations some amount of 
prosecutorial teeth. 
Conceptual Clarifications: Ethnocide/Culturecide vs. Genocide 
Genocide is often understood to be the murder of a group of people distinguished by their ethnicity 
(Charny 1994); whereas ethnocide, at least as used herein, is the eradication of a ethnicity (or of a 
culture), whether by genocide or by other means such as forced cultural assimilation or reeducation 
(Beardsley 1976). However, there is still wide disagreement on the uses of these two terms, and these 
different views should be considered in the context of establishing precise relations between them. The 
usage given above is similar to that of Charny (1994), whereby “ethnocide” refers to acts that prevent 
the continuation of an ethnic group’s traditions and practices; but Charny excludes the murderous acts 
of genocide from being included in “ethnocide,” whereas I here allow that ethnocide may be 
deliberately accomplished via genocide. Charny’s use of the term is thus synonymous with that of 
“culturecide.” My use may then be closer to that of Beardsley (1976), who sees that exterminating the 
sole bearers of a culture (that is, by murdering them) may be one way to effect ethnocide. Apparently, 
Lemkin (1944), who coined or brought the terms “genocide” and ‘ethnocide’ into currency, saw them 
as strictly synonymous. However, usage since then, including the introduction of “culturecide,” has 
varied.1 
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Alternatively, Lukunka (2008) suggests that since the work of Jaunin (1972), “ethnocide” as the non-
murderous process of eradicating a culture has taken hold in general, as Sautman (2003) endorses: 
Ethnocide by this reading is “extermination of a culture that does not invoke the physical extermination 
of its people.” (p. 177) Moshman 2001) and Churchill (1997) warn that distinguishing the terms may 
lead to the possibility that ethnocide may lose a common consciousness that it can be just as great an 
evil as genocide. Although the two terms are sometimes conflated, the distinction I describe lies at the 
heart of this paper’s concern, which is the possibility that ethnocide, particularly via assimilationist 
policies, in practice often entails genocide. Seemingly paradoxically, then, I must begin this paper with 
the understanding of the terms as distinct in order to make the point that the two concepts they refer to 
profoundly intersect in practice when assimilationist policy is at work. In the end, though, there is no 
paradox; rather, an initial clarification of the distinction between terms is necessary so that it may be 
shown how, in fact, they intersect in the real world, that is, in light of anthropological and social-
psychological realities. 
I then differ from Stein’s (2003) conclusion that the lack of rigor in all of these terms’ usages makes 
them—or at least “ethnocide”—unfit for analytical purposes. As long as an author clarifies the 
meaning, as I have done herein, the term should prove useful. The important point in my usage for this 
paper’s purposes is that ethnocide may be accomplished not through directly murderous intentions. As 
this paper shows, even intentions that are not overtly murderous, in eradicating a culture, as through 
assimilationist policy, still may have murderous effects and thus constitute at the least massive 
negligent-homicides of members of a particular group. All degrees of massive homicide of members of 
a group for being members of that group are understood to be genocide. Thus, the massive negligent-
homicides resultant from such ethnocide, inflicted on those group members for being members of it, 
would be genocide. 
The distinction of the terms is then not in perpetrator intentions, as perpetrators of ethnocides may be as 
bent on eradication of lives as those of overt genocide, but in methods, as ethnocides may allow 
methods that are not of direct violence against individuals, whereas genocides involve such direct 
violence. Our consciousness of making such a distinction should lead, as Moshman observes, to ‘direct 
our attention toward the similarities and interrelations between ethnocide and genocide, including the 
possibility of classifying these together as part of some superordinate, and yet to be named, category. 
This raises the possibility that “ethnocides… are no less evil than genocides.” (446) 
I propose that the level of this superordinate category is in perpetrator intent of cultural eradication, and 
that the subcategory distinguishing the two is in method, which in practice may lead to the same evil 
result, fatality by perpetrator hands. The next section further details how this paper draws these 
distinctions and similarities. The key concept here is not whether a group is a real object (as distinct 
from individuals within groups), but the reality of the effects of groups and actions taken upon groups 
for their members. 
The Reality or Non-reality of Human Groups 
Some writers have contended that ontologically there is no such real entity as a group or community 
outside the individuals who compose it.2 The philosopher Gould (2004) clearly articulates this view. 
According to it, a tribe or a band is not a real entity, but at best is a concept about persons who 
commonly associate and share interests. These community members may share, to varying degrees, 
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beliefs and practices, but those beliefs and practices cannot be said to be entities separate from the 
individuals who maintain them. Further, usually individuals within a community may have such widely 
differing interpretations of a practice, or even ways of executing a practice, that it may be hard to affirm 
that what appears to, say, an ethnographer as a unified practice is actually so (see Hudson 1972 and 
Dentan 1979 for ethnographic examples). Given this nebulousness, and the fact that the only real 
entities in a given community are its individual members, besides their artifacts, by a view such as 
Gould’s it is best not to reify “community” or “group” or “tribe.” It would follow, then, that when a 
group is, for example, assimilated into another community and as a group has ceased practicing the 
earlier traditions and assumes new practices, nothing is lost because human lives have been preserved 
and it is these that are real. It would further follow that, since ethnicity is only a group’s beliefs and 
practices and these are not real entities, and “killing” outside of figurative use refers to taking lives, then 
ethnocide is either not possible or is a misnomer. 
I offer an alternative to this view. The position, though, does not assume that ontologically a tribe, 
ethnicity, or community actually is a real object if of a different kind from humans (that is, individuals). 
Rather, I take a circumstantial—if riskily contingent—approach: Assimilation and related means of 
eradicating a culture, especially if forced, does have real effects upon people as if their beliefs and 
customs are real entities and such entities have moral standing (actions concerning them are morally 
accountable). Such assimilation thus does affect people— severely, as I shall describe— and the end 
result can be devastating, often fatal. The contingency of this argument is, in the end, less risky than 
initially feared and may point to a fact about humans, so that in policy we should treat tribes and 
communities as real entities even if ontologically they are not. 
Genocide may often entail ethnocide, as occurred with many genocides in history, such as that of 1800s 
United States (Sheehan 1973) 1800s Australia (Tatz 1999, Moses 2000; also Short 2010 on ongoing 
genocide there)) the Shoah (Matthaus et al. 2011), 1915 Armenia (Dadrian 2003), 1990’s Rwanda 
(Lernarshand 2002), and 1990’s Kosovo (Kallis 1999). These were focused on eradicating certain 
ethnicities. I will show that the reverse is also true, that ethnocides turn out to be genocides in practice. 
In many ways, despite terminological difference, I build upon Short’s (2010) findings about what he 
calls “cultural genocide” (after Lemkin) in contemporary Australia, and then generalize. In this kind of 
practice, then, the two terms become equivalent, or ethnocide via assimilationist policy ↔ genocide, in 
a superordinate category of the sort Moshman proposed. This equivalence should make a marked 
difference in policy. 
The Language Analogy: Phenomena of Value 
Because of certain ontological similarities between culture and language, it is worth considering the 
nature of language to the extent it intersects with the issues of culture and ethnocide. Languages, like 
ethnic groups and cultures, are subject to deliberate eradication. This susceptibility points to a 
commonality between language and culture as types of phenomena. I do not argue that languages are 
real things and so cultures and ethnicities must be, too; rather that, whatever the precise ontological 
status of language and culture, they appear to be comparable, and their loss has real effects 
Davis (2008) has reiterated the concern of many observers that of roughly 6000 languages spoken now 
(some by only one or two remaining speakers), at least half of these will be extinct by the end of the 
century.3 Many of those remaining will be spoken by only a few thousand or tens of thousand. Whether 
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or not the “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” (Whorf 1956) is true (and it is still debated; see Koerner 2000, 
Kou and Sera 2007, Wolf and Holmes 2011), if there are not exactly certain language-determined 
modes of thought that will disappear, at the least many thousand unique forms of human 
communication, each with its uniqueness and beauty, will be lost (Sampat 2001, Davis 2008). One 
objection to such worry may be that there is no real loss; human communication is about what is 
communicated, not its mode. If the whole race were to speak only one language, then the better for 
communication and perhaps world peace. 
Without pursuing this sociopolitical avenue, I refer to an argument that Diamond (2012) for why the 
objection stated here is insubstantial. Language difference does not make for war (consider 
Switzerland), nor does language similarity make for peace (witness the American civil war). Language 
differences also do not forestall communication but in fact enrich it. “Different languages have different 
advantages,” Diamond observes (p; 405), specifically, multilingualism increases one’s capacity to 
communicate in ways that being monolingual cannot achieve and has been shown to increase mental 
power. Furthermore, retaining a great variety of the world’s languages increases motivation and 
opportunity for expanding communication capacities. “Hence language loss doesn’t only curtail the 
freedom of minorities, it also curtails the options of majorities.” (Diamond 2012, p. 405) 
Indeed, something—whatever its ontological status—of human value is lost in language extinction. 
Human language and culture are products of the human mind, and humanity is deprived when such 
singular, ingenious, and non-deleterious products disappear. One should consider the loss if Stonehenge 
or the Easter Island statues were destroyed, or the Taliban’s razing of the Afghani Buddhist statues.  
The issue can digress into impersonal-value problems, similar to that of whether the universe would be 
worse off if the human race never existed; I cannot pursue such speculative inquiry here. I offer instead 
a second way of seeing language loss as deprivation of common value. Quine and Chomsky, usually 
opponents, may intersect here. Quine (1960) would say that one could not be sure of the inter-
translatability of the one language to the other (the substitute). Thus, communications and translations 
of old texts would be at least different, and it would be hard to say if the new language would be better. 
Chomsky (1966, 1975), while asserting that one language can do anything another can, if allowed 
sufficient time and space; would still maintain that the structures of each languages would be different; 
and with foreshortened access to the lost-language’s structure, we would have that much less rich of a 
resource for understanding human psychology. So in different ways, the two authors would see some 
loss of value.  
A third view would be that the loss of a language’s way of compartmentalizing concepts—whether or 
not these affect the way we think—still would be diminishing poetic possibilities because of loss of 
connotations (compare Nettle and Romaine 2000 on “Lost Words, Lost Worlds”). A pint is simply not 
0.4732 liter. A pint is dry measure as well, which evokes strawberries as well as stout. A “half pint” is a 
weakling kid while a half 0.4732 liter is no such thing. Certainly, a natural language as we know it 
cannot exist anywhere in space as can a brick or bone. But it is a type of phenomenon that has human 
value in its own right. 
Besides these issues of the value of language diversity for humanity at large, there is the other 
deprivation of value that Diamond mentioned: The loss of an indigenous language is also the loss of 
freedom of the people whose language is lost. This loss is often due to assimilationist policy, such as 
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that of the Residential Schools in the U.S. As Reyhner and Singe quote the 1868. Report of the U.S. 
Indian Peace: 
Schools should be established, which [American Indian] children 
should be required to attend, their barbarous dialect should be blotted 
out, and the English language substituted. (p. 2) 
If the residential schools in the U.S. represented an effective collusion between government and state 
(curious in a country in which these two social functions were to be separate) to alienate children from 
their parents’ and ancestors’ languages as well as cultural traditions, they have provided models for 
comparably powerful programs across the world to this day. 
A culture is a phenomenon of comparable value, in its own right, to that of language. Many 
anthropologists (Mead 1929, Hunter and Whitten 1977, Dentan 1979, Lee and Daly 1999, Kelly 2007, 
Davis 2008, Wells 2010) have emphasized the uniqueness of the adaptations and ways of life of 
different groups, parallel to that of the uniqueness of language as modes of communication. A culture’s 
region and geography can impart a certain logic or “laws of nature.” A seaside culture such as that of 
many Polynesians would, compared with a desert culture such as that of the Kalahari’s San, thus differ 
not only in their foods and tools but in their cosmology. Davis (2008) makes a plea not only for the rich 
diversity of cultures but also for why it is necessary for the richness of human life as a whole for this 
diversity to be sustained maximally. Conscientious decisions of certain parties—governments and 
powerful private concerns—could make a difference here. At stake is not only well-publicized 
commercial concerns, such as local knowledge about traditional medicines gathered from natural 
sources. There is also a concern for, in want of a better term, the “psychic space,” or the differing views 
of the world, of humanity, nature, and being, of arts and metaphysics, even of ways of eating and of 
interacting with one another. The wider range of such possibilities extant could spark human 
imagination and creativity. Certainly, a worldwide human monoculture could end up being drab, if not 
depressing, impoverished in other ways of living and thus dulling the imagination, and even, like an 
agricultural monoculture, could leave the species less adaptable to great changes. This instrumentality 
is analogous to the discussion concerning language, as there may be a value to cultural diversity in 
itself, in that each culture, like each language, may be valuable for those who partake in it. Such 
instrumentality tends to be geared for those peoples privileged by means of global access, via such 
rational inquiry as anthropology. After all, while peoples were forced, for various reasons, to change 
their cultures often do succumb and change; peoples given an informed choice often retain what they 
have (Dentan 1979; Davis 1995, 2008; Lee and Daly 1999). 
A detractor may say that, as with language, which exists to communicate, a culture is there for the 
purpose of supplying humans with values and practices so that they can go about their daily routines in 
a directed and meaningful way, not to be colorful and different from one another. In fact, if we all 
shared the same culture, say rational Western industrialism, so much the better for quotidian needs and 
world peace. In response, again without going far into this sociopolitical digression, global monoculture 
may not improve quotidian life, especially if that monoculture were resource-intensive and alternative 
resources did not become available with sufficient rapidity. Such a monoculture would be divorced 
from the influence of regional geography in that sense noted early, by which indigenous cultures, at 
least, are shaped by the local “laws of nature.” Quotidian life could then be made more difficult even if 
more expedient. Furthermore, a single world culture, as with economic monopolies, without lack of 
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competition could lead to autocracy or plutocracy. (Gould 2004 and Caplan 2011 caution against world 
government for such reasons.) The potential for world peace is not inconsistent with multiple cultures, 
and the process of effecting world peace by creating a monoculture is not guaranteed to generate peace. 
To the extent that language is a type of human phenomena with real value, and that humans value a 
given language, so is culture a type of human phenomena with such values. Both may not be real 
objects ontologically, but language and culture in general, as well as specific ones, have real value for 
people, much as real objects have value. If the Canadian courts, for example, have upheld the need to 
retain a group’s oral tradition, without the language on which that tradition’s orality is based, the court’s 
command cannot be followed. Conceivably, people could even pay money—something (strangely 
enough) “real” for economists—to retain a language or culture, as much as to retain an object like a 
house. Not just conceivably, but in fact, some indigenous groups are paying to be taught their native 
languages (Lee 2012). 
This is as far as I need draw the comparison between language and culture for the sections to follow. 
There is another way to gauge how important a phenomenon a particular culture is, and that is when it 
is forcibly eliminated. The physiological response is as real as that to indisputably real objects such as 
microbes. 
The Real Effects 
Culture and language bear similarity not only in their natures but in the process of their elimination. A 
language may be forcibly eradicated, as has happened innumerable times in history: when the French 
forced the Bretons to learn French, or American colonists forced their slaves to learn English. Force 
may be less ostensive, as when a California Native-American culture is so gradually absorbed into the 
larger one, particularly when for economic needs, that speakers use it less and less with each other and 
the last speaker dies (Crystal 2000). In the eradication process, language and culture can be so 
intermixed, it is hard to tease them apart.4 I then concentrate on culture eradication, as it seems difficult 
to tease apart language eradication per se from that of eradication of the culture overall. (If one 
considers a culture’s specific language as a part of their culture, the effects of loss of the culture would 
incorporate those of the loss of the language.) 
A good amount of ethnographic studies of cultures that have been subject to assimilation into larger 
societies, whether or not by direct overt force, show these cultures to follow a remarkably consistent 
pattern the world over (Hudson 1972, Hunter and Whitten 1977, Dentan 1979, Davis et al. 1995, Lee 
and Daly 1999, Davis 2008; also Short 2010 for analysis). I concentrate on the numerous ethnographies 
in Lee and Daly, which all concern foraging societies, most of which currently are undergoing 
assimilation, whether all or part of the group, although partly horticultural societies such as that 
discussed by Hudson (1972) and Dentan (1979) exhibit a similar pattern. What is remarkable about the 
results, whether in Australia, the Americas, the Arctic or tropical Asia, is the similar symptomology. 
These are so similar as to resemble symptoms of a general human predisposition.  
Asch and Smith (1999) write of Canada’s Slavey Dene, after they were moved into permanent 
communities supplied with electricity and water systems: “There are social, economic, and 
psychological problems; alcohol and substance abuse; a troubling level of violence and neglect; and 
economy that generates less cash than needed…” (p. 49). Of the James Bay Cree, Feit (1999) observes, 
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“Whenever colonial practices or improved development encroach upon the possibilities for responsible 
autonomy, then social problems (including increased alcoholism, drugs, and violent abuse) have 
intensified for individuals and especially youth.” (p. 44) On Hudson Bay, Caribou Inuit communities 
are afflicted by an array of social problems stemming from rapid social change. Among these are 
domestic violence, sexual abuse, suicide, parental neglect, lack of motivation, and general anomie.” 
(Burch and Csonka 1999, p. 58), not to mention substance abuse (alcohol, drugs, and inhalants). Lest 
some critics blame the long nights and long winters of these regions for such depressing results of 
social change, warmer and sunnier climates fare no better for culturally disrupted peoples. California’s 
formerly forager Timbisha Shoshone, reservation-less but on Federal land that had been taken from 
under them (for a national park), forced into permanent settlement without title, have their children 
bussed to schools 135 km distant. “Alcoholism and related social problems are high in a number of 
families.” (Fowler 1999, p. 70)5 
At one time, some writers introduced the hypothesis that alcoholism was rampant among American 
Natives because they were subject to an overwhelming expression of an “alcoholism gene.” (Enoch et 
al. 2006 describe and falsify this hypothesis.) If so, then this gene has miraculously appeared among 
hunter-gatherers the world over, despite these groups’ not being otherwise in any closer genetic 
relationship than industrialized Europeans are with industrialized Japanese. The /Gui and //Gana of 
Botswana, for example, have been driven to “Sedentarization around the water bore, [where] the new 
availability of sugar for brewing, and dramatic changes in the lifestyle contributed to the rapid spread of 
alcohol consumption and the attendant social problems such as community violence.” (Tanaka and 
Sugawara 1999, p. 198) Many of the Okiek of Kenya, hardly related to the /Gui and //Gana, have 
settled into houses and scrounged for jobs, and “Much of the income, received in small installments, 
has been spent on liquor. The amount of drinking has skyrocketed…” (Kratz 1999, p. 223) The 
Wanniyala-aetto of Sri Lanka are also not particularly related to any of these previously described 
groups, yet “The termination of their autonomy and changes in diet contribute to new diseases: obesity, 
high blood pressure, heart problems, alcoholism. Frustrated at the usurpation of their way of life, the 
Wanniyala-aetto also suffer psychologically.” (Stegeborn 1999, p. 272) Such a problem as obesity 
develops, of course, with a paucity of the lean protein that foragers for millennia relied upon for diet; 
with their traditions taken away and starchy government food subsidies substituted, obesity results. 
Furthermore, a vicious cycle develops in which traditional social roles and responsibilities, such as 
hunting or gathering, are disrupted, lowering sense of worth, leading to substance and domestic abuse, 
which further lower self-worth. And further still from the /Gui or Okiek, in Australia the Warlpiri well 
represent what has happened to a great amount of the indigenous peoples on that continent upon even 
partial assimilation: “This activity… is counterpointed by ongoing alcohol abuse and domestic abuse, 
petrol-sniffing among teenagers, egregious health statistics…” (Dussart 1999, p. 366) Australia’s Tiwis 
have been moved into townships, which “have their share of social problems (violence, physical abuse, 
and alcohol.” (Goodale 1999, p. 352). Short (2010) details the severity of social problems that have 
developed upon the “cultural genocide through urbanization” of many of Australia’s indigenous groups. 
While alcoholism can be deadly, as can increased domestic violence, some steadfast critics of the 
possibility that such degeneration is in itself fatal may call these responses loss of spirit but not loss of 
life. They may go further and contend that these responses are the responsibility of those affected, who 
must find a way to adjust, if they desire. Such an approach is then a counterpart of the “alcoholism 
gene” view, which also lays responsibility upon the affected, specifically on the affected persons’ genes. 
However, further signs of the effects of forcible assimilation are less attributable to “diseases of the 
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will.” The formerly forest-dwelling Mikea of Madagascar have lost much of their forest from habitat 
destruction by deforestation. Once moved into villagers, they “tend to be exploited by villagers… The 
Mikea are [now] plagued by high rates of tuberculosis, leprosy, and skin diseases brought out primarily 
by the scarcity of bathing water.” (Kelly, Rabedimy, and Poyer 1999, p. 218) The Agta of Luzon “For a 
century have been forced to settle in urbanized barrios… Today, Agta relations with the social and 
natural environments worsen as mainstream diseases, malnutrition, and endemic violence all contribute 
to social stress and lower life expectancy.” (Griffin and Griffin 1999, pp. 291-292) 
To make the optimal case for the proposition that forced settlement and assimilation of peoples and 
eradication of their traditional cultures lead to these fatal degenerative processes, whether social-
psychological (alcoholism, domestic violence) or physical (infectious and chronic diseases), a full 
record of pre-oppression conditions would be needed. That is, one would need studies pre-assimilation 
indicating levels of these diseases, to compare with post-assimilation levels. Certainly, many if not most 
of these cultures had no alcohol before more powerful cultures such as European introduced it. Many 
cultures, though, had their own intoxicants (Chagnon 1977, Davis 2002) Furthermore, many forager or 
horticultural-forager cultures, such as the Manga and Dani of New Guinea or the Tlingit of the Pacific 
Northwest, have been recorded as having high levels of internecine violence; and upon their oppression 
by stronger powers, such as the Australian government in New Guinea or the Canadian in British 
Columbia, violence among these groups diminished (Pinker 2011). Thus, inquiries into the precise 
types of changes in levels of all kinds of diseases as spurred by assimilation and settlement may be 
challenged by serious epistemic obstacles. However, it is implausible that group after group which 
exhibited high levels of vigor and physical and intellectual activity before assimilation, settlement, or 
culture-eradication but then afterwards succumbed to apathy, anomie, and depression were not very 
negatively affected by the process. Furthermore, the groups that did retain great amounts of territory, 
autonomy, and cultural practice, and in a few rare cases (such as the Eastern Penan for a long time, until 
recently; see Davis et al. 1995 and Davis 2008) retained their foraging lifeways, showed lower amounts 
of these diseases. There is good reason to concede that cause-and-effect is at work here, not mere 
correlation: When people lose their lands, their ways of life, their hope, their understanding of what the 
world is and what it is about, and sometimes their families and children, they succumb to loss of self-
worth and hence depression, drug and alcohol use, suicide, criminality, and new infectious and chronic 
diseases. Persons in industrialized cultures are certainly not immune to such outcomes upon their 
personal losses and related chronic social stresses (Blascovich et al. 2001, Dyrbye et al. 2006, Whyte et 
al. 2013). Added to the fact that oppression itself adds stressors (James et al. 1983), it is only reasonable 
that a similar response can occur to individuals in comparable situations of loss in non-industrialized 
cultures. The difference is that, when a government or other industrial power, such as a corporation or 
religion, is forcing individuals in certain groups—because they are in those groups, practicing their 
practices—to change, there are moral issues: of agency forcibly imposing unwanted activities, of 
breakage of individual and group rights, and of possibly further infractions, all of which go against the 
spirit and letter of UNDRIP. 
The Symptomatic Human Response 
Humans in non-industrialized cultures the world over have responded to forced assimilation, being 
deprived of their lands, settlement, and eradication of their cultures by falling into depression, anomie, 
alcohol and drug abuse, apathy, and domestic violence. The most plausible explanation so far for such 
responses is that the forcible culture-change causes such responses in humans. If social oppression of 
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minorities causes chronic stresses and permanent physiological degradation in minorities in 
industrialized cultures (James et al. 1983, Blascovich 2001), it is reasonable that greater oppression and 
through destruction of one’s culture causes comparably intense psychological and physiological 
damage. Anthropology and psychology has indicated that humans are generally the type of being that 
requires a system of beliefs and practices and of implementing these practices in everyday life (Phillips 
and Whitten 1977, Davis et al. 1995, Davis 2008). With these beliefs and practices come a set of 
values, such as valuing the lives of children and close kindred over others, or of sharing, or of 
stewardship for the land and its biota. These beliefs, practices, and values are not only tightly integrated 
with one another but within the individual’s life over time, throughout its various stages. Without the 
system of beliefs, the human mind would lack a schema describing the point of the practices’ day-to-
day functions. And without undertaking the practices at all, there is no point in the beliefs or in holding 
them. Each of the two—beliefs and practices—demands the other.  Simply substituting an arbitrary 
system of beliefs for the original one, while retaining the same practices and values, or substituting 
arbitrary new practices while retaining beliefs and values, would not be functionally operable. As the 
data in this section has evidenced, completely replacing all is traumatic. A human being apparently 
needs an integrated set of values, beliefs, and practices in order to function in one’s complex social 
milieu. If parts of the set start to be extensively disproved, denied, prevented, or otherwise eradicated, 
the individual, as the data indicates, may panic, lose function, and become emotionally and in turn 
physically distressed. In short, with such a radical, forced change in one’s existence, one’s self-worth 
diminishes as radically, and then set in the degenerative illnesses such as substance abuse and 
depression. 
This much is thus known to social sciences. That world community that is concerned with the morality 
and legality of current governmental and other powerful bodies’ policies as well as international law 
fostering these, should be interested in the perspective offered here: Namely, such culture-eradicating 
actions do have real, de facto deleterious social psychological effects. These effects lead to no less than 
slow physical—not merely a nebulous “spiritual”—death in these moral patients. That is, these actions 
result in massive manslaughter or even homicide. The degree of the violence—whether manslaughter 
or some degree of homicide—would, of course, vary with situation and intention. Currently, some 
extreme situations, such as in Darfur, may reflect intent to kill on the part of the perpetrating parties. 
Other cases, such as that of the Penan of Sarawak (Davis et al. 1995, Brosius 1999), with multiple 
perpetrating parties and intentions, both governmental and commercial, may be harder to assess 
morally and legally. The Sarawak state and Malaysian federal governments may primarily intend only 
to convert the Penan remaining in the forest to “modernism” and “civilized” ways attainable only by 
permanent settlement, so they may be guilty of “only” negligent homicide. Logging concerns and 
police working at the barriers may see their intentions against the Penan escalate to other levels of 
criminality. The Botswana government has been no more innocuous in its policies toward the 
indigenous groups of the Kalahari, going so far as to disregard Botswana High Court rulings (Survival 
International 2013c). Similar malfeasance is ongoing in other countries: in Asia, among India’s 
Dongria; in the Americas among eight Brazilian tribes; and in Africa among Kenya’s Ogiek6 (Survival 
International 2013d, b, and a, respectively). 
Now that the real effects of culture eradication, that is ethnocide, are seen to cause such deleterious 
responses in humans as to increase fatal levels of stress and result in morbidity and fatalities, such 
programs should more accurately be deemed for what they are: genocide. Regional and worldwide 
governing bodies, from the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization to the United Nations, have then an 
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obligation to their member nations, to those nations’ indigenous groups, and to those groups’ individual 
members, to shape policies in accord with the reality of these programs and treat them as genocide and 
enforce rules against such programs 
The Role of Group-Rights 
It may seem that current group-rights documents in place should, if duly followed, suffice to require 
such policy-shaping. If Malaysia were to act in accord with all the articles of the United Nations 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), they would allow the Penan to stay on 
their lands and pursue their foraging lifeways. They may even follow Scandinavia’s example with the 
Sami, or in certain respects Canada’s attempt with Nunavut—overlooking the fact that it came only 
after the indigenous groups heavily lost self-worth and succumbed to domestic and substance abuse—
and establish autonomous regions. Such action may be able to neutralize or counteract some of the fatal 
responses of attempts at ethnocide. 
Truly, group-rights are valuable recourses, allowing one legal route for groups who are so organized as 
to be able to fight to defend past and possibly ongoing incursions (Lee and Daly 1999). Yet, there are 
some inherent weaknesses in this approach via group-rights for protecting indigenous and other 
cultures from ethnocidal incursions. One is that many groups, as seen in the Lee and Daly (1999) 
enthographies, have already been weakened to the point that it would not be clear what is an act of 
governmental “rescue” and what is an act of the groups’ desperation to have anything to latch onto for 
salvation. Related to this problem is that with ongoing erosion of the group’s practices, beliefs, and 
values, the group has often not developed any defensive measures for protecting their traditional 
lifeways. In both these kinds of cases, it is unclear just what role group-rights protections can play in 
practical terms. For many groups, there are also ambiguities about territories, because many of them 
have traditionally been nomadic without permanent parameters in the sense of real estate (Miller 2013). 
Group-rights documents such as UNDRIP depend upon a group’s connections to well-delineated 
territories for enforcement, as in UNDRIP articles 8.2.a, b, and c; 10; 11; 12; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; and 
32 (United Nations 2007). All of these problems could be countered, to some degree, by a global 
understanding that, whatever the transitional, transitory, practical, or territorial situations of the culture 
facing incursion and eradication, the policies of whatever is the power-body (governmental, 
commercial) are in fact genocidal. This wider understanding of the real effects can only help mobilize 
efforts, by the people themselves or through other agency, to ensure their maintenance of their cultural 
practices, values, and beliefs. 
One objection to introducing this element of massive homicide or genocide into what may otherwise be 
handled by group-rights approaches is that it may mean broadening the concept of genocide too much. 
If the concept is broadened too far, it may lose its current strength as an international rallying call.7 If 
some members of groups who have experienced culture-eradication attempts are only sickly and dying 
a few years younger than they had, calling this situation “genocide” may seem implausible to many and 
in turn erode or dilute the term. There is indeed a risk of terminological abuse. Some hunter-gatherer 
groups, such as the Jahai of Malaysia (van der Sluys 1999) have “to date, no problem of alcoholism or 
drug abuse” (p. 311) despite a range of results from attempted assimilation (from some members’ 
becoming settled to others’ remaining nomadic). Risk of terminological abuse signals need for caution 
in taking action, not for abandoning the wider understanding of the frequent homicidal effects of 
ethnocide. 
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Other problems include the fact that what exactly constitutes murder or homicide is not universal, and 
can even change over time within a culture; and thus the possibility that ethnocide will be readily, 
universally deemed massive homicide or genocide may face such varied perceptions. Another obstacle 
is the potential that some of the problems experienced by cultures forced into assimilation or 
undergoing eradication may be ambiguously endemic in the culture itself. Agencies, organizations, or 
commentators resisting indigenous peoples’ self-governance or contending the facts in this paper 
showing the genocidal dangers in relentless assimilation policy as globalization picks up pecuniary 
steam may turn to such apparent cultural ambiguities as justification for the status quo. Thus, more 
attention to clarifying these cultural ambiguities is important for securing policies protecting indigenous 
peoples from these genocidal processes. 
Problems such as these do not appear to be so insurmountable as to dismiss the advantages for 
vulnerable peoples’ protections of their lives and lifeways in acknowledging that assimilation and 
eradication efforts are commonly genocidal because of their deleterious effects. As Short (2010) writes 
about Australia’s indigenes, “Even though genocidal social death can be produced without specific 
‘intent to destroy,’ I would argue that there is reasonably foreseeable intent here.” (2010, p. 62) Intent of 
eradication by whatever means would, of course, be central in determining degree of 
homicide/genocide in international legal action. In many of the cases of indigenous cultural 
assimilation I have discussed, such as the Malaysian government’s programs for the Penan, a court 
would have evidence to adjudicate intent of eradication, if that be by death. As mentioned in this 
paper’s introduction, such intent is what unites genocide and ethnocide in a superordinate category 
including them both. 
Because of individuals’ needs to belong to a culture and have a stable sense of what the world is and 
thereby retain their self-worth, of what is valuable in the world and community, and of what sort of 
activities are meaningful and useful, continuing a culture is more than a matter of enjoying a group 
right. It involves the individual’s right to life, to not being killed by governmental or commercial 
policies, and is a basic individual right (Shue 1980). It is incumbent upon the international law 
community to promote the understanding that ethnocidal governmental and commercial policies such 
as those of Malaysia toward the Penan are massive-homicidal and thus genocidal. 
Notes 
1. Another contrastive usage is that of Reyhner and Singh (2010), who use “cultural genocide,” much 
as I do “ethnocide,” as the killing of a culture but not necessarily by directly killing the members of the 
group 
2. Without digressing into the metaphysical quandaries of what constitutes a real object, I will only go 
so far as saying that for the purposes here a real object is contrasted to an imaginary one Barack Obama 
and his DNA are real objects; Hamlet and unicorns are imaginary. 
3. Estimates of number of languages range up to about 7,000 (Sampat 2001; Lewis, Simmons, and 
Fennig 2013). Some projections estimate the number of languages remaining by the 22nd Century may 
be as few as 600 (Sampat 2001), possibly as low as 300. See also Nettle and Romaine (2000) and 
Klaus (1992). Nettle and Romaine not only equate language loss to loss in biodiversity and habitat but 
tie these together, seeing them as part of an overall phenomenon, the parts of which synergize with one 
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another. Loss of a language commonly means loss of a culture, which means loss of knowledge of 
habitats as well as, in practice, loss of those habitats. 
4. It is interesting, perhaps telling, that the English term “linguicide” is not clearly analogous to 
“ethnocide.” It is odd to attempt to eradicate a culture but not the language, or vice versa. Linguicide, 
rather, is a concomitant to ethnocide, language being perceived as a part of a cultural practice. It is hard 
to say if this result follows from a Whorf-Sapir-type effect (the language does bring with it a unique 
worldview that is embedded in the culture) or more purely emotional reasons (if the culture is killed, it 
is too painful to attempt reviving merely the language). Indeed movements, as in Ireland and Hawai’i, 
to bring back old languages and cultures often include both. Modern Israel, though, may be somewhat 
of a counter-example, as it has revived a nearly extinct ancient language, not only without that ancient 
culture itself but with a motley of subcultures established long since the ancient Diaspora, such as that 
of Hasidic sects, Ethiopians, and modern Europeans. Hinton and Hale (2001), though, contend the 
Hebrew revival is not so much a pure revival as one that reflects this motley of cultures and their 
dialectal influences. Mufwene (2000, 2008) argues that languages are in fact not killed, say by 
hegemonic languages such as English or French, but that speakers shift to other languages as social or 
economic reasons give them cause; thus, “linguicide,” as the deliberate killing of a language, would be 
somewhat of a misnomer. 
5. Tellingly, the Huaorani of Ecuador, “Despite predictions that the national society would quickly 
absorb this reduced, egalitarian, and foraging group… are, twenty-five years on, flourishing.”—Yet, 
“Compared to other Amazonian Indians, the Huaorani have retained a substantial land base; their 
language was never suppressed.” (Rival 1999, p. 103) When a group retains its land and language, it 
has a greater chance of surviving relatively intact. Also tellingly are the Bihor of India, who “refused to 
be evicted from their jungle habitat…. The Bihor are peaceful, basically withdrawn and introverted; 
they are addicted neither to drugs nor to abusive, violent behavior.” (Adhikary 1999, p. 251) 
6. An alternate of “Okiek.” 
7. Stein (2002) offers some related precautions about overuse of “-cide” words and concepts. Glanville 
(2009) offers an important consideration of how “genocide” has lost its original strength as a word 
inciting agents to action. 
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